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ASSESSING ASSESSMENTS: A SURVEY OF 
EFFORTS TO MEASURE COUNTRIES' 
COMPLIANCE WITH FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS 
Lance Compaf 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article surveys efforts by governmental and non-
governmental organizations to assess countries' compliance with core 
labor standards on workers' freedom of association. The relevant 
standards are Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. 
Part II sets out key conceptual issues, particularly the distinction 
between "negative" and "positive" rights. Part III discusses the 
challenge of generating and getting accurate information about 
workers' freedom of association, especially when so much subjective 
judgment is inherent in the effort. Part IV reviews and summarizes 
the work of several organizations that evaluate countries' compliance 
with core labor standards on workers' freedom of association. Part V 
offers a conclusion and recommendations. 
II. CLARIFYING THE ELEMENTS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
International standards on freedom of association for workers 
have several component parts that any compliance measurement 
system must consider. While they can be further subdivided, these 
include freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to 
bargain collectively, and the right to strike. In human rights terms, 
these are "negative rights." That is, for the right to be honored, the 
state need do nothing—just leave workers alone. Don't harass them, 
don't arrest them, don't imprison them, don't kill them for trying to 
t Senior Lecturer, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. 
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exercise these rights. Here, the key analytical question for compliance 
is whether the state is leaving workers alone to exercise these rights. 
But for each of these, protection of the right is critically 
important. They are also "positive rights" requiring governments to 
act affirmatively to afford the rights.1 A government that respects 
workers' negative rights is not meeting its international human rights 
obligations if private individuals or groups can violate workers' rights 
with impunity. The state must protect the rights by providing 
effective recourse and remedies for violations. 
To take a simple example, it is not enough that in a particular 
country the government refrains from punishing workers who try to 
organize unions. What is also needed is a positive right to form and 
join unions coupled with an effective protection and enforcement 
structure that deters employers from punishing workers who try to 
organize unions. Here the analyst must examine the legal structure 
and the content of laws protecting workers' rights, the extent of their 
coverage, and the effectiveness of the legal machinery designed to 
implement the laws. Remedies and sanctions are important, too, for 
determining if the legal system creates a deterrent to violations. 
An assessment system must also appreciate the complexities in 
judging labor rights compliance. Collective bargaining fits well with 
the concept of a negative right that workers could achieve through 
their own struggles if the government leaves them alone. But real 
world experience upsets this neat concept. Without laws to enable 
collective bargaining, many employers refuse to bargain and dismiss 
workers who join unions.2 Workers have to act politically to obtain 
laws allowing them to bargain collectively. This makes collective 
bargaining a positive right afforded by government action. 
The analysis must consider not just whether a government 
intervenes in the collective bargaining process, but whether the 
intervention allows ample space for workers to defend their interests 
or whether it chokes workers into tight bargaining spaces dictated by 
government policy. This analysis is perforce subjective. Few 
1. The distinction between "negative" and "positive" rights is standard in human rights 
discourse. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (1996); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989). 
2. This was the situation under U.S. labor law before passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
of 1932 and the Wagner Act of 1935. Before those laws, employers often made workers sign a 
contract never to join a union, as a condition of gaining employment. Where workers succeeded 
in forming unions, employers often refused to deal with them, leading to strikes and a poisoned 
labor-management relationship. See, e.g., JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 1933-1937 
(1974). 
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countries prohibit collective bargaining outright, but the narrowness 
or breadth of bargaining capacity vary greatly. 
The right to strike is another complex matter. In concept, it is 
another negative right—workers could freely exercise it if left alone 
by the state. A threshold question, therefore, is whether a 
government bans strikes or acts to break strikes by military or police 
force. Beyond these cases, however, the situation gets more 
complicated and moves to the area of positive rights that need 
protection by the state. 
As with collective bargaining, governments everywhere intervene 
to condition, limit, or channel the right to strike—by excluding certain 
groups of workers or industries, by limiting its exercise to certain time 
periods, by restricting associated tactics like picketing or distributing 
literature, and so on. The problem is to decide what limits are 
reasonable and what limits constitute an effective denial of the right. 
A properly designed system for assessing country performance in 
meeting international standards on workers' freedom of association 
should examine each of these elements. In evaluating assessment 
efforts discussed in this paper, the main criteria applied is the extent 
to which they: 
• cover all the key elements in freedom of 
association for workers —the right to organize, the 
right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike; 
• consider both the negative and positive aspects of 
workers' right to freedom of association—the role 
of government non-intervention, leaving workers 
alone so that they might exercise their rights, as 
well as government intervention to protect 
workers' exercise of their rights; and, 
• appreciate and reflect the complexities of freedom 
of association by probing, through consistent 
methods (questionnaires, interviews, on-the-
ground investigation, etc.), the real-world context 
in which to fix their findings. 
III. THE SLIPPERINESS OF INFORMATION AND THE DIFFICULTY OF 
GETTING ACCURATE COMPARABLE MEASURES 
A. Problems With Indirect Measures 
Indirect measures of freedom of association do not measure 
compliance directly, but instead are proxies built on assumptions 
about what the results of genuine freedom of association will be—for 
example, that freedom of association will be associated with a higher 
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level of ILO convention ratifications, with higher union density, and 
so on. These assumptions may or may not be correct. Individually, 
these and other indirect measures are not very good proxies. 
1. Using ILO Ratifications and Industrial Relations Indicators 
Several problems inhere in any effort to quantify countries' 
compliance with freedom of association requirements by objectively 
measured proxy indicators. Analysts have mostly used, either alone 
or together, ratification of ILO conventions and union density (the 
percentage of union-represented workers in the labor force) to reflect 
freedom of association.3 
The crudeness of ILO ratifications as an indicator of respect for 
workers' freedom of association does not need elaboration. Many of 
the worst labor rights violators have duly ratified ILO Conventions 87 
and 98. Some countries with better records have not. 
Union density may be a better indicator than ILO convention 
ratifications, but unless it is contextualized, union density by itself 
does not say much. The first problem is that union density numbers 
are not fully reliable. The ILO's description of its methodology for 
calculating union membership suggests the intricacy of this exercise.4 
Trade unions often inflate their membership numbers to give an 
impression of strength. Official statistics are not always accurate, 
either. 
Even where union density numbers are accurate, one still finds a 
lot of room for interpretation. France has extraordinarily low density 
in terms of dues-paying union membership, less than 10%. But it has 
relatively high density in terms of the percentage of workers covered 
by collective agreements, estimated at 80%. It also has a very high 
"mobilization capacity" indicating robust freedom of association for 
workers. This is an indicator more likely to be captured by social 
3. See, e.g., Drusilla K. Brown, International Trade and Core Labour Standards: A Survey 
of the Recent Literature, OECD LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY OCCASIONAL PAPERS 
NO. 43 (2000), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/OLIS/2000DOC.NSF/LINKTO/DEELSA-
ELSA-WD(2000)4; J.S. Mah, Core Labor Standards and Export Performance in Developing 
Countries, 20 WORLD ECON. 773 (1997); M. Rama, Do Labor Market Policies and Institutions 
Matter? The Adjustment Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean, LABOR, Special Issue, 
at S243-S268 (1995); Dani Rodrik, Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and 
What Do We Do About Them?, in EMERGING AGENDA FOR GLOBAL TRADE: HIGH STAKES 
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL ESSAY NO. 20 (R. 
Lawrence, D. Rodrik & J. Whalley eds., 1996). 
4. See ILO, Task Force on Industrial Relations (GT/RPJ, Industrial Relations, Democracy 
and Social Stability, Technical Notes, Industrial Relations Indicators, WORLD LABOUR REPORT 
1997-98, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pkits/wlr97.htm. 
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movement scholars, not by economists or industrial relations 
researchers. 
Strike data, such as frequency, length, and person-days of strikes, 
can indicate respect for the right to strike and a healthy collective 
bargaining system. But the data would always have to be interpreted. 
Few strikes might mean that labor and management bargain freely 
and readily compromise to reach agreements without stoppages. 
They can also suggest a repressive system where workers are afraid to 
strike for fear of reprisals or replacement. 
Even the most reliable of these measures does not by itself fully 
capture the dimensions of freedom of association or answer the query 
whether the state is affording negative rights (leaving workers alone 
to exercise their rights) and acting to afford positive rights. The key is 
to put these indicators together. That is, it may be possible to include 
and analyze multiple measures or indicators based on such objective 
information, creating a composite index that can be consistently 
applied. But each needs a heavy dose of interpretation if it is to factor 
accurately in an overall assessment of country compliance with 
freedom of association standards. 
2. Measuring Enforcement Capacity 
Another possible proxy for countries' compliance with freedom 
of association standards is measuring quantifiable factors like labor 
ministry budgets and staff, numbers of workplace inspections, 
caseloads of administrative and judicial bodies, number of workers 
reinstated, amounts of fines and penalties, and other features of a 
labor law enforcement system that can be reduced to numbers. 
Adjusted for size of the labor force, number of firms, distribution of 
firms by size, level of development, and other variables, comparative 
measures of country enforcement efforts can be achieved. 
But problems arise here, too. Take cases at the extremes. 
Country A, where labor law enforcement is efficient and has a 
deterrent effect, has a relatively small workers' rights enforcement 
budget, staff, caseload, etc. Country B, where reprisals against 
workers are common, but workers have no faith that the legal system 
will vindicate their rights, also has a relatively small enforcement 
capacity. The numbers come out the same, but only intimate 
knowledge, interpretation, and judgment can tell what the numbers 
mean. 
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3. Evaluating Legislation 
Labor legislation straddles indirect and direct measurement of 
compliance with core labor standards. Laws and regulations that 
clearly infringe workers' rights are direct indicators of failure to 
comply. Laws and regulations that purport to protect workers rights, 
however, are still uncertain proxies until showing that they are 
effectively enforced. 
Threshold evaluations can examine laws with relative ease to 
determine whether the right legal framework is in place to afford 
freedom of association to workers. Laws that require membership in 
government-run federations, that prohibit company-wide or industry-
wide bargaining, or that ban strikes either outright or in "essential" 
industries based on government economic policy, are clear markers of 
failure to meet international labor standards, as defined by the ILO. 
Most countries' laws are not so clear-cut. They are usually mixed 
bags, with some features that comport with freedom of association 
standards and some that fall short. U.S. law, for example, forbids 
discrimination against workers because of union activity, a sine qua 
non for protection of the right to organize. However, U.S. law also 
excludes from coverage of such protection vast swaths of the labor 
force—agricultural workers, domestic workers, low-level supervisors, 
and "independent contractors" who are really quite dependent on one 
employer for their livelihoods. 
Mexico's constitution guarantees the right to organize, but 
Mexican law prohibits the formation of independent public sector 
unions. Chile claims to have met international standards by granting 
workers the right to bargain at a company-wide or industry-wide level, 
where before only single workplace-level bargaining was permitted. 
But the law allows employers to unilaterally veto bargaining above 
the single workplace level, and unions are not permitted to strike to 
obtain broader bargaining rights. 
Examples like these are almost infinite. The point is that once 
researchers pass a threshold of "easy" analysis of labor law texts for 
obvious conflict with freedom of association guarantees, a myriad of 
complications come into play that require detailed examination. In 
the end, careful judgment must be applied to conclude whether a 
country's laws and legal system, on balance, comport with 
international standards. 
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IV. REVIEW OF EXISTING REPORTING EFFORTS AND THEIR 
SOURCES, METHODOLOGY, INDICATORS, ETC. 
Existing reporting mechanisms and their possible use as models 
for development of a systematic evaluation of compliance with 
freedom of association standards are divided here into three broad 
groups, with some subdivision within them. 
• In a first group are a large number of eclectic 
reporting efforts by various NGOs, corporations, 
government agencies, international agencies, and 
other organizations that take up international labor 
rights in their work. These reports can be regular, 
occasional, or one-time. They can be focused on 
one country or one region, or focused on one 
factory or one industry. They can be prompted by 
complaints under a legal enforcement process or 
under a quasi-legal oversight mechanism. They 
can be any combination of these. 
• In a second group are annual or other periodic 
descriptive reports on many countries using a 
consistent evaluation scheme. All draw on a 
variety of sources of information to develop 
country-by-country descriptions and evaluations of 
the extent to which workers' freedom of 
association is implemented. These reporting 
systems stop short of comparing countries. 
However, their content can be used by others to 
carry out comparative assessments. 
• In a third group are those reporting systems that 
are explicitly comparative. These draw heavily on 
sources from the second group, attempting to 
extract objective indicators from descriptive 
reports. They also use other types of indices to 
evaluate countries' performance on respect for 
workers' rights. These reports combine a variety 
of sources to develop composite scores and 
comparative rankings of countries. 
A. Group One: Selected Country and Complaint-Based Descriptive 
Reports 
Descriptive labor rights reporting outlined here provide a 
valuable source of information about particular countries, and some 
are helpful as sources of ideas for the broader goal of establishing 
precise country criteria. However, these reports must be used with 
caution. Many are selective in their coverage, especially one-time 
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reports. Many focus on a single case of a country, an industry, a 
company, or one factory. This means they are not comparable or 
generalizable. They sometimes reflect interests of the organization 
doing the report, compromising independence. 
The reports in group one do not offer a model for comparative 
assessment. However, these comparative weaknesses are a 
substantive strength. The reports often provide in-depth, factually 
rich information that can usefully be incorporated into broader 
evaluation systems. 
1. Government Agency Reports 
a. USTR/Trade Policy Staff Committee 
Chaired by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the 
Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) is the interagency group that 
reviews labor rights complaints under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP). It also takes up complaints under labor rights 
clauses in Caribbean Basin, Andean Pact, Africa Growth, and other 
trade statutes. 
The TPSC assesses a country's worker rights performance to 
determine if GSP beneficiary status should be maintained or cut off. 
TPSC decisions to remove a country from GSP beneficiary status 
because of labor rights violations are important markers for State 
Department reports and other U.S. trade programs. The Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) "rides" TPSC decisions in 
GSP cases to determine if countries remain eligible for OPIC 
coverage. 
Economic and foreign policy concerns have dominated TPSC 
labor rights decisions, producing inconsistent results. For several 
years in the late 1980s and early 1990s the TPSC rejected labor rights 
petitions on Guatemala and El Salvador on the grounds that evidence 
of trade unionists victimized by arrests, beatings, and assassinations 
made a case for human rights violations, but not labor rights 
violations. The TPSC also said that the mere introduction of 
legislation advancing worker protection, although such legislation had 
no chance of passage, was "taking steps" to meet GSP labor rights 
requirements.5 
5. See, e.g., GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Workers Rights 
Review Summary: Petitions Not Accepted For Review (Guatemala 1988,1989,1990,1991) (on 
file with USTR). TPSC and related OPIC decisions are generally not available in libraries or at 
agency Web sites; they must be viewed in public documents rooms at agency headquarters. 
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When the Chilean and Paraguayan military dictatorships began 
to wobble in the late 1980s, the TPSC gave them a shove by 
suspending GSP benefits. But equally reprehensible labor rights 
records in Indonesia and Malaysia were ignored when U.S. 
multinational corporations with extensive investments in those 
countries insisted that GSP benefits be maintained there.6 Until 
USTR and the TPSC evince consistent, balanced, on-the-merits labor 
rights analysis, their reporting on workers' freedom of association 
should be used with caution. 
b. NAO Reports under the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation 
NAFTA's labor side agreement, the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), lets trade unions, NGOs, and other 
groups file workers' rights complaints to an agency in each country's 
labor department called the National Administrative Office (NAO). 
In an unusual "cross-border" system, complaints are filed with the 
NAO of another country—not the country where claimed violations 
occurred. 
NAO's have no enforcement power. Instead, they undertake 
investigations and produce reports. Such reports by the U.S. NAO on 
freedom of association complaints in Mexico and Canada usually 
reflect careful analysis and reporting. The NAO has held public 
hearings in the United States with witnesses from those other 
countries. It has also engaged consultants and independent 
researchers who provided valuable information based on in-country 
research and interviews. 
As noted earlier, the U.S. NAO's mandate is limited to labor law 
matters arising in Mexico and Canada. However, its use of varied 
information sources, public hearings, and independent consultants 
provides another valuable model of key components in a new country 
assessment system. 
Canada's NAO has produced thorough reports on important 
freedom of association complaints involving Mexico under the 
NAALC. The problem, as noted earlier, is that this trove of 
information on workers' freedom of association is all devoted to one 
country. The challenge in constructing an assessment system 
6. For a detailed treatment of TPSC actions, see Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor 
Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB L. & POL'Y J. 
199 (2001). 
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applicable worldwide is to approach the same depth and 
sophistication in examining all countries' labor rights performance. 
2. International Agency Reports 
a. International Labor Organization Review of Government Follow-
up Reports 
The ILO's 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work requires countries to self-report their efforts to meet 
the declaration's goals, including the goals of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining. Nearly half of the ILO's 175 member 
countries did not report on their performance regarding freedom of 
association under the declaration.7 The reports of many others were 
mostly self-serving, though the U.S. government for the first time 
acknowledged problems with protection of workers' right to organize. 
Despite the limited country reporting, the ILO did an excellent 
job in distilling the reports and adding its own independent knowledge 
of information, producing the global report, Your Voice at Work. In 
this report, the ILO named names of countries failing to comply with 
important elements of conventions 87 and 98.8 For example, it cites 
fifteen countries that fail to protect agricultural workers' right to 
organize (including Afghanistan, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, 
and the United States). The Your Voice at Work report set markers 
for many countries on freedom of association issues they need to 
address. Any new compliance measurement system should use these 
markers and examine whether countries have improved their 
performance. 
b. World Bank 
The World Bank has begun to take core labor rights into account 
in formulating Bank policy with respect to member countries. Bank 
staff are advised to undertake a four-part analysis of core labor 
standards in preparing a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS): 
(1) legal and institutional assessment; 
(2) factual assessment; 
7. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, REVIEW OF ANNUAL REPORTS UNDER 
THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE I L O DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT 
WORK (2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb277/dl-
index.htm 
8. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, YOUR VOICE AT WORK, at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/vaw/pdf/fullreport/part_l.pdf. 
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(3) actions taken to rectify abuses; and, 
(4) Bank strategy for addressing potential negative 
impacts on the country's development, due to its 
treatment of core labor standards. 
The legal and institutional assessment includes the ratification 
status of ILO core conventions, a brief assessment of national laws 
relating to core labor standards, and discussion of enforcement 
provisions and government capacity. For its "factual assessment," the 
Bank calls on staff to "report briefly what is happening in practice 
regarding the core standards, despite what protections might be 
guaranteed in law. For example... are workers prevented from 
organizing?" 
Applying this approach, the World Bank has included discussions 
of core labor standards in recent CAS's involving India, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Armenia, Indonesia, and Uganda. However, these 
analyses are very thin and mostly address child labor issues. Freedom 
of association is barely touched. In fact, the Bank appears to hedge 
on whether freedom of association is as important a core labor 
standard as child labor. The Bank sometimes views workers' 
organizing and bargaining rights as economic privileges that can be 
afforded or restricted to achieve desired economic outcomes. It 
acknowledges that its treatment of association, organizing, and 
bargaining rights, as distinct from child labor, forced labor, and 
discrimination, "is complicated by (a) the potential political nature of 
the standards and (b) research showing ambiguous economic 
outcomes."10 
c. NAFTA Labor Secretariat 
The Secretariat of the North American Commission for Labor 
Cooperation has produced, in addition to labor market reports and 
studies, substantive analyses of workers' freedom of association in the 
three member countries.11 These are 200-page books covering vital 
aspects of association, organizing, and bargaining rights, compared 
9. See WORLD BANK, CORE LABOR STANDARDS TOOLKIT—DIAGNOSING CORE LABOR 
STANDARDS IN THE CAS, at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/HDNet/HDdocs.nsf/ 
2d5135ecbf351de6852566a90069b8b6/98df7256b3dd946185256946006b5256?OpenDocument. 
10. See WORLD BANK, CORE LABOR STANDARDS AND THE WORLD BANK (July 2000), at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/HDNet/HDdocs.nsf/2d5135ecbB51de6852566a90069b8b6/655107 
96ed04acl685256961004c6e7c?OpenDocument. 
11. Most important, PLANT CLOSINGS AND LABOR RIGHTS (1997), available at 
http://www.naalc.org/english/publications.htm; LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN NORTH AMERICA 
(2000), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/publications.htm. 
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with a few paragraphs on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining in State Department Section 6 reports. 
Nonetheless, these reports provide a model of completeness for 
analyzing a country's labor law system. The Secretariat's 
methodology for producing these reports is also worth emulating with 
features like selection of outside experts to provide independent 
background papers, a rigorous internal editing process, dialogue with 
government officials and key actors in trade union, employer, and 
NGO communities and a final level of review by outside experts 
before publication. 
3. Private Actors' Reports 
a. AFL-CIO 
The AFL-CIO has not before now undertaken formal country 
assessments, but its American Center for International Labor 
Solidarity launched a new project producing in-depth reports on two 
countries, Mexico and Sri Lanka. The reports cover all the core labor 
standards. If the project goes forward after this experiment, it will 
expand to cover more countries. With expert staff in field offices 
around the world working closely with local trade unionists, the 
Solidarity Center has a solid base for thorough labor rights reporting. 
This bears watching as a potentially important source of information 
in the future. 
b. U.S. NGO reports 
Within the limits of this paper, two U.S. NGOs most often cited 
in connection with labor rights reporting are examined in some detail: 
Freedom House and Human Rights Watch. Other U.S. NGOs 
engaged in labor rights reporting are discussed in more summary 
fashion. 
i. Freedom House (FH) 
As noted earlier, several analysts use Freedom House rankings12 
as a factor in assessing countries' compliance with core labor 
standards. Dani Rodrik used FH's "democracy" index. In work 
12. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm. 
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discussed below, David Kucera of the ILO used three different FH 
indices, on civil liberties, political rights, and democracy.13 
FH reports do not fully treat labor rights issues. The only 
template questions posed are "Are there free trade unions and 
peasant organizations or equivalents" and "Is there effective 
collective bargaining?" FH does not make a systematic effort to 
probe deeper into the multiple elements and the complexities of 
association, organizing, bargaining, and striking. 
This is not to fault Freedom House for these shortfalls on labor 
rights. It is not a labor-oriented organization or one with particular 
labor expertise. FH has its hands full producing a worldwide survey of 
"freedom" broadly defined. It would be unfair to demand that it also 
thoroughly treat workers' rights. 
ii. Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
Nearly every analyst looking at labor rights points to Human 
Rights Watch's annual report as an important source of information 
on workers' freedom of association.14 But HRW has some of the same 
limitations as Freedom House. It is not a labor-oriented or labor-
expert group. Focus on workers' rights is idiosyncratic, depending on 
the interests and priorities of area and thematic directors and of 
country researchers. 
HRW's annual report leaves out a lot of countries. The 2002 
report did not cover the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, or Ecuador, all 
countries with freedom of association issues worth examining from a 
human rights perspective. 
From time to time, HRW publishes a major country report on 
workers' rights. A 2000 report examined workers' freedom of 
association in the United States.15 Recent reports dealt with child 
labor in U.S. agriculture, discrimination against women in 
Guatemalan maquila factories, and freedom of association and child 
labor in Ecuador's banana sector.16 These reports are focused and 
13. See Rodrik, supra note 3; David Kucera, Decent Work and Rights of Work: New 
Measures of Freedom and Collective Bargaining, in THE ILO AND THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY 125,134 (R. Blanpain & C. Engels eds., 2001). 
14. See the annually issued HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT, available at 
http://www.hrw.org. 
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 
(2000), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslabor. 
16. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FINGERS TO THE BONE: UNITED STATES FAILURE TO 
PROTECT CHILD FARMWORKERS (2000), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/frmwrkr; HUMAN 
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thorough, providing valuable information and analysis. They are 
accordingly more reliable than HRW's annual report for assessing 
workers' freedom of association in a country. Unfortunately, only a 
handful of countries undergo in-depth labor rights studies by HRW. 
As with Freedom House, because of their haphazardness on 
labor rights, HRW's annual reports should not be an initial part of a 
systematic rating system for countries' compliance with core 
standards. If HRW commits itself to regular reporting on workers' 
rights in its annual reports, given its track record for thorough, 
reliable, high-quality human rights reporting, it would be appropriate 
to use the contents of HRW annual reports in a new database. In the 
meantime, HRW's more focused country and company reports on 
workers' rights should be included in any assessment system. 
iii. Human Rights First (HRF) 
HRF is a New York-based NGO and a founding member of the 
Fair Labor Association (see Codes of conduct monitors reports, 
below). HRF has created a "Workers Rights Information Project" 
(WRIP) aimed at corporate performance. It explains: 
As globalization pushes the workplace farther and farther out of 
our direct view, a system of transparency becomes ever more 
important. The project's goal is to help create that system and 
make this kind of information directly available to the public in 
quick, accurate, and useful form. 
The project is putting an early focus on the accuracy and usefulness 
of information already being collected in this field. It is preparing 
a database that compiles the full range of different yardsticks now 
being used to try to assess the treatment of workers in particular 
factories. 
The database collects and organizes these measurements in their 
thousands of individual components, from over a hundred different 
sources in the labor standards field. This effort will lay the 
groundwork for improvements and help target the areas where 
improvement is most needed. It should also help the development 
of more systematic and consistent practices in this field, leading to 
better information and better assessments of compliance with 
workers rights standards.17 
RIGHTS WATCH, FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
GUATEMALAN LABOR FORCE (2002), at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/guat; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, TAINTED HARVEST: CHILD LABOR AND OBSTACLES TO ORGANIZING ON 
ECUADOR'S BANANA PLANTATIONS (2002), at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/ecuador. 
17. See http://workersrights.humanrightsfirst.org. 
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This project is not far enough along to include here, but it should be 
examined when it is up and running. 
HRF has also produced brief reports on workers' rights in 
Cambodia, China, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, and South 
Korea.18 However, these are not detailed enough to use for a rigorous 
evaluation system. 
iv. International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) 
The Washington, D.C.-based ILRF does not undertake regular 
country reporting. It has produced occasional country reports. Now 
outdated ILRF reports covered Haiti, India, and Chile. More 
recently, ILRF produced reports rich with information on child labor 
in the Ivory Coast and discrimination against women in Kenya.19 
But beyond occasional country reports, ILRF collects a great deal 
of relevant country information in connection with GSP petitions, 
NAALC complaints, and civil lawsuits on behalf of workers' rights. 
The ILRF was a lead petitioner in GSP cases involving Guatemala, 
Colombia, Chile, Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and several other 
countries. It was the first NGO to actively engage the NAALC 
complaint process in Mexico-based cases. It is serving as plaintiffs' 
counsel in civil lawsuits against companies implicated in workers' 
rights violations in Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, and 
Burma.20 These petitions, complaints, and related briefs can be mined 
for information on both company and country behavior that is 
thoroughly documented. 
v. Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR) 
Washington, D.C.-based CLR focuses on "rapid action network" 
campaigns for public attention and reaction to workers' rights 
violations in countries around the world. Most recently, CLR 
promoted campaigns on Noboa banana plantations in Ecuador, a 
Samsonite luggage facility in Thailand, and an apparel factory in El 
Salvador producing for Gap, Ann Taylor, and other retailers.21 
18. Id. 
19. For these reports and others that follow, see the ILRF Web site at 
http://www.laborrights.org. 
20. ILRF won a dramatic legal victory September 18, 2002 when a U.S. federal appeals 
court overturned a district judge's dismissal of a lawsuit against Unocal Corp. for forced labor 
abuses in Burma. The appeals court ordered the case to go forward to trial. See Lisa Girion, 
U.S. Ruling Says Firms Liable for Abuse Abroad, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at Al . 
21. See the CLR Web site at http://www.campaignforlaborrights.org. 
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Working under tight deadlines with a goal of urgent action, CLR does 
not undertake longer-term, systematic research. But its information is 
usually well founded, and it serves an important "early warning 
signal" function pointing to freedom of association issues in different 
countries susceptible to deeper research. 
vi. National Labor Committee (NLC) 
Based in New York City, the NLC is an advocacy group that 
organizes delegations of workers and investigators from the United 
States to foreign countries, and speaking tours by foreign workers in 
the United States, dealing with sweatshop conditions in factories 
making apparel, footwear, toys, and other products for the U.S. 
market. The NLC emphasizes what it calls a "high profile campaign 
style" aggressively using the media to publicize workers' rights 
violations and to bring pressure on U.S. companies that subcontract 
with supplier firms abroad.22 
The NLC has done extensive firm-focused reporting on Wal-
Mart, Walt Disney Company, Nike, Liz Claiborne, Ralph Lauren, 
and, in one of its most dramatic media campaigns, on clothes carrying 
the Kathie Lee Gifford label. NLC country reports have covered 
Bangladesh, Burma, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua. Most of the country reports have been short, punchy, 
popular-style calls to action by readers, but they always contain 
detailed information listing factory locations by name, and the U.S. 
retailers they supply. 
c. Foreign NGOs and Web sites 
A broad variety of NGOs based in other countries produce 
credible reports on workers' freedom of association. Their reports 
vary in quality, but using the best ones would bring more of an 
international and an NGO cast to a new comparative country 
compliance assessment system that otherwise relies on "official" 
government and trade union reports. Both to have international 
credibility and to draw on the merits of these NGOs' work, analysts 
should systematically review such reports and include relevant 
information in assessing countries' performance on workers' rights. 
• Based in London, Amnesty International (AI)23 is 
probably the most prominent and most often cited 
22. See the NLC Web site at http://www.nlcnet.org. 
23. See the AI Web site at http://www.amnesty.org. 
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foreign NGO. Treatment of Amnesty 
International's worker rights reporting is forgone 
here because the discussion above on Human 
Rights Watch applies equally to AI. Both groups' 
reports should be scrutinized for workers' rights 
information, but keeping in mind that they are 
haphazard in covering this field. 
Solidar is another European NGO that deals with 
labor rights.24 Formerly International Workers 
Aid, renamed Solidar in 1995, this Brussels-based 
group is an alliance of European NGOs and trade 
unions that takes up social justice issues, usually 
focusing on the European Union and its relations 
with developing countries. Solidar publishes 
regular "International Updates" on labor in the 
global economy. These are mostly news snippets 
on trade and labor standards, with special attention 
to the role of the European Union in the World 
Trade Organization. But these reports contain 
occasional links to more substantive workers' 
rights reports. 
Hong Kong-based Asia Monitor Resource Centre25 
produced high quality worker rights reports 
covering Asia-Pacific regions for more than a 
Cjuarter century. Its quarterly Asia Labour Update 
is an important source of timely information. 
Current research and reporting efforts focus on 
comparative labor law in Asia-Pacific countries, 
layoffs in China's special economic zones, women 
workers in Asian EPZs, the impact of transnational 
corporations' subcontracting on workers, 
transnational subcontracting and social 
development, migrant workers in Southern China, 
and monitoring workers' conditions and workers' 
rights in the sports shoe, garment, and toy 
industries. 
Established in 1987, the London-based 
International Centre for Trade Union Rights 
(ICTUR)26 produces a high quality quarterly 
journal called International Union Rights covering 
labor rights issues around the world. It is 
particularly good in its coverage of African 
countries, which get much less attention than other 
developing country regions. ICTUR recently 
24. See the Solidar Web site at http://www.solidar.org. 
25. See the Asia Minor Resource Centre Web site at http://www.amrc.org.hk. 
26. See the ICTUR Web site at http://www.ictur.labournet.org. 
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• 
created an International Commission for Labour 
Rights to undertake country-specific research and 
reporting projects in years ahead.27 
China Labour Bulletin28 and Human Rights in 
China29 are just two of several NGOs reporting on 
workers' rights issues in China. NGOs working on 
China suffer some degree of factionalism, so some 
independent advice would be needed to sort out 
the players and their biases. The two groups noted 
here produce regular, well-documented reports on 
labor rights in China. A similar effort by a new 
NGO called Global Standards focuses on 
Vietnam.30 
Brazilian trade union researchers produce an 
independent bimonthly report called Correio 
Sindical Mercosur that is indispensable for 
monitoring worker rights developments in the four 
Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay, plus more on Chile, Peru, and other 
Mercosur associates). In January 2002, supported 
by several North American unions and trade union 
federations, they added an English edition, titled 
Mercosur Union Post, available by email free of 
charge to persons requesting it.31 
• United Kingdom-based Labourstart is an 
independent Web site providing daily news feeds 
from around the world on labor issues.32 While it 
includes trade union organs among its sources, 
most links are to articles in respected mainstream 
newspapers. The articles are sorted by country, 
permitting a continuing, updated account of the 
state of workers' exercise of rights to organize, 
bargain, and strike in each country. 
• Based in Geneva, the Global Unions Web site is a 
project of global union federations (which used to 
be called International Trade Secretariats, ITS's) 
affiliated with the ICFTU. It provides regular, 
updated reports on events within sectors of 
industry and within specific multinational 
corporations.33 
27. See information at http://www.labourcommission.org. 
28. See http://iso.china-labour.org.hk/iso. 
29. See http://iso.hrichina.org/iso. 
30. See http://www.global-standards.com. 
31. See http://www.sindicatomercosul.com.br. 
32. See http://www.labourstart.org. 
33. See http://www.global-unions.org. 
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d. Codes of Conduct Monitors' Reports 4 
The proliferation of corporate codes of conduct has led to 
creation of several monitoring systems that can inform a systematic 
effort to assess countries' compliance with freedom of association 
standards. But there are limits to these efforts. First, they focus 
mostly on plant-specific conditions in developing country factories 
that produce, usually on a subcontracting basis, for U.S. and 
European-based multinationals. Still, recurring violations in a country 
suggest government failure to protect workers' rights and can be 
taken into account in assessing a country's performance. Some of the 
most prominent "stakeholder" codes are the European-based Ethical 
Trading Initiative (ETI) and Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), and the 
U.S.-based Fair Labor Association (FLA), Worker Rights 
Consortium (WRC), and the Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) 
plan of Social Accountability International (SAI). 
The ETI brings together NGOs, companies, unions, and non-
governmental organizations to identify and promote good practices in 
the implementation of codes of conduct, including monitoring and 
independent verification. The ETI has developed a multi-sectoral 
"Base Code" based on ILO standards. It includes provisions for a 
living wage, freedom of association, and security of employment.35 
The CCC was successful in bringing together Dutch NGOs, national 
trade union federations and associations of apparel retailers and 
manufacturers in a five-year process of negotiations for an industry-
wide code of conduct that includes strong provisions on freedom of 
association, hours of work, and a living wage and contains provisions 
for independent monitoring and certification.36 
Major U.S. apparel companies are participating in the FLA along 
with NGO representatives. Their monitoring system establishes a 
systematic process for evaluating factories' (not countries') 
compliance with its code of conduct, which includes respect for 
workers' freedom of association. The code sets forth a strong, 
detailed, eighteen-point set of "benchmarks" on freedom of 
association that cover key elements of workers' right to organize and 
bargain collectively (though it is silent on the right to strike). Sources 
for FLA reporting include on-the-ground interviews with workers and 
34. The best NGO providing comprehensive information on labor rights codes of conduct is 
the Canadian Maquila Solidarity Network, at http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/resources/codes. 
35. See http://www.ethicaltrade.org. 
36. See http://www.cleanclothes.org. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y. J. 301 2002-2003 
302 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 24:283 
managers, records review, visual inspection, and related analysis and 
reporting.37 
With recent moves to make its monitoring results publicly 
available, the FLA promises to be an important source of information 
on events inside countries where factories are monitored. However, 
labor conditions in particular factories selling to major multinationals 
may not reflect general labor conditions in a country. 
The WRC grew out of the anti-sweatshop campaigns of the 
United Students Against Sweatshops in the U.S. The consortium aims 
to ensure that university-licensed apparel is manufactured according 
to the WRC Model Code of Conduct or other university codes that 
comport with the WRC model.38 The consortium stresses that 
companies whose suppliers are found to violate WRC standards 
should not adopt a "cut and run" policy canceling contracts and 
leaving workers unemployed, but should stay and work to correct 
problems. 
The WRC's is a complaint-driven system, not a comprehensive 
monitoring program. It has completed fewer than ten factory reports.39 
WRC reports reflect high quality, intensive on-the-ground research, 
including treatment of government performance on workers' rights. 
But since its work is so ad hoc, it can really only supplement more 
systematic reporting on the country involved. 
New York-based Social Accountability International calls 
SA8000 "a comprehensive global verification standard for auditing 
and certifying corporate responsibility." SA8000 aims to bring 
consistency to labor rights standards in various codes and in 
procedures for social auditing. Its standards are drawn from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, from U.N. human rights 
covenants, and ILO conventions.40 Unlike some of the other U.S. 
monitoring organizations, the SAI leadership includes organized labor 
(the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' 
Federation). 
SAI trains and accredits social auditing firms and individual 
auditors, who then are hired by companies to certify that they or their 
suppliers comply with SA8000 standards.41 SAI is also training union 
leaders in Asia, Latin America, and Africa to monitor compliance 
37. For more details, see http://www.fairlabor.org/html/monitoring.html. 
38. See http://www.workersrights.org. 
39. See http://www.workersrights.org/freports.asp. 
40. See http://www.sa-intl.org. 
41. A list of accredited auditors is available at http://www.sa-intl.org/Accreditation/ 
CertificationBodies.htm. 
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with corporate codes of conduct. SA8000 reports do not report 
violations, they only report certified factories.42 
B. Group Two: Comprehensive Descriptive Labor Rights Reports 
The organizations in this group perform comprehensive annual 
reporting on workers' rights in most countries, generally applying the 
same methods to each. They stop short of a country comparison, 
ranking or scoring system. Instead, they lay descriptive reports of 
country experiences side-by-side and leave it to others to score results 
and make comparisons. 
There are several important features of these reports. First, they 
are broad in coverage, including all or most countries in the world. 
They look at all the components of freedom of association, including 
organizing, bargaining, and the right to strike. They examine whether 
governments, through state action, are interfering with these rights, 
and also whether governments are providing effective protection of 
the rights. Most important from a methodological point of view, they 
seek to apply a standard formula in a systematic way to all countries. 
In sum, they provide a rich source of raw data that can be mined for 
comparative purposes. Three reporting initiatives stand out in this 
category: 1) the U.S. State Department and its annual "Section 6" 
reports on workers' rights in every country, 2) the ICFTU and its 
annual survey of violations of trade union rights in every country, and 
3) annual reports by the ILO's Committee of Experts and Committee 
on Freedom of Association, which together address workers' rights in 
practically every country. 
1. U.S. State Department 
The State Department's annual human rights report's Section 6 
for each country is the most universal and systematic reporting on 
workers' freedom of association.43 It is a descriptive reporting 
mechanism, not a ranking mechanism that assigns comparative value 
to a country's performance. While still mixed in quality, the reports 
have greatly improved in recent years, benefiting from higher priority, 
a consistent reporting template, and embassy labor officers (formerly 
called attaches) who are better trained and motivated by the new 
42. See the list of certified factories at http://www.sa-intl.org/Accreditation/ 
CertifiedFacilitiesIntroduction.htm. 
43. The most recent report, for 2002. is available at http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/ 
index.htm. 
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importance given their work. Labor officers have an on-the-ground 
presence that allows them to interview key actors and get the 
necessary "feel" for the labor rights situation that they can then 
translate into objective reporting. 
The department's instructions to labor officers advise them first 
to note any ILO, GSP, and OPIC cases involving the country, as well 
as information in ICFTU and other NGO reports.44 The instructions 
then set out fifteen general questions on rights of association, 
organizing, and bargaining (with several sub-questions) and require an 
answer to each, with explanatory detail. 
Some of the questions are factual ("Note the percentage of the 
total work force that is organized.... Were there legal or illegal 
strikes during the year? If so, how many? .. . Has the government lost 
GSP or OPIC benefits on worker rights grounds?"). Some require 
legal analysis ("Cite any categories of workers that are not permitted 
to join a union . . . Does the law protect workers from employer 
interference in their right to organize and administer their unions?"). 
Still others require interpretation and judgment ("Are unions 
subordinate to the government, political parties, or any other political 
forces in law or in practice? . . . Do labor administrative and judicial 
bodies function independently? . . . Is collective bargaining freely 
practiced? . . . Is the law effectively enforced? . . . Are there significant 
restrictions in EPZ's?"). 
The later questions, those needing interpretation and judgment, 
go to the heart of a country's performance on labor rights. It may be 
possible to develop a quantitative reflection of the Section 6 reports 
by laying the questions alongside the responses for each country and 
assigning value to yes and no answers, to factual responses, and to 
qualitative terminology (e.g., "significant restrictions"). 
However, this should only be part of a systematic approach. 
Section 6 reports are not definitive. Their mixed quality is due to a 
number of factors. For one, while some labor officers are committed 
to promoting workers' rights, others are not really attuned to or 
enthusiastic about workers' rights compared with investors' or 
executives' concerns that get more embassy attention. 
Even the best labor officers are not free agents. Ambassadors, 
their deputy chiefs, and other embassy officers review Section 6 drafts 
before they are sent to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor (DLR) in Washington. They sometimes trim the drafts to 
44. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS 
(unclassified memo on file with author). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y. J. 304 2002-2003 
2003] ASSESSING ASSESSMENTS 305 
avoid offending host countries. Still, considering their scope and 
overall reliability, the Section 6 reports are an indispensable starting 
point for measuring countries' performance on labor rights. 
2. ICFTU 
The ICFTUY Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 
has become a standard reference on workers' freedom of association.45 
The survey does not rank countries in a quantitative fashion. It 
provides an overview of labor law and practice, and describes specific 
cases of violations during the year reported. Parallel to this effort and 
replicating it in most instances, the ICFTU has also produced several 
country reports to the World Trade Organization in recent years.46 
The quality of the ICFTU's reports has improved markedly. 
Earlier efforts were spotty, with wide variations in country reports, 
and sometimes more argumentative than informative. Lately, though, 
the reports have gotten more consistent, more thorough, and more 
dispassionate, letting facts speak for themselves. The reports are still 
"one-sided" in the sense that they present trade unionists' accounts of 
assaults on their rights during the past year for each country reported. 
But they are carefully documented and provide a comprehensive 
overview of the situation worldwide, lending themselves well to the 
kind of quantitative use put to them in comparative reports. 
3. ILO Committee Reports 
The ILO maintains an extensive supervisory system generating 
detailed reports on workers' freedom of association in every country. 
The main supervisory organisms are the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEARC) and 
the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA). The ILO also has 
commissions of inquiry, committees of experts, fact-finding 
committees, ad hoc committees, ad hoc special representatives, and 
other reporting mechanisms. 
With some exceptions, the ILO's Web site contains helpful 
information on these bodies in its "International Labour Standards" 
pages. Researchers can access reports on a country-by-country basis, 
making it possible to systematically examine countries' compliance.47 
45. The most recent Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights is available at 
http://www.icftu.org/survey2003. asp?language=EN. 
46. These reports are at http://www.icftu.org/list.asp?Language=EN&Order=Date&Type= 
WTOReports&Subject=ILS; http://www.icftu.org/www/pdf/survey2001en.pdf. 
47. See ILOLEX database at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y. J. 305 2002-2003 
306 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 24:283 
However, some key country documents such as reports by technical 
assistance missions, direct contacts missions, and commissions of 
inquiry do not get posted on the Web site. 
The CEARC reports, published annually,48 are quite technical, 
usually involving texts of laws and how they comport with conventions 
already ratified. COFA reports are usually more pointed because 
they respond to complaints and address concrete problems of 
workers' rights violations. 
Under the constraints of diplomatic niceties, most ILO reports 
use very guarded language. The reader has to search for a declarative 
sentence or a firm conclusion. The best the COFA could do 
addressing the United States' permanent striker replacement doctrine 
was to say that it "entails a risk of derogation from the right to 
strike."49 Nonetheless, these reports provide a consistent, formulaic 
approach susceptible to systematic analysis of code phrases, which was 
the use the OECD made of them (see below). 
One important caution with the richer COFA reports is that they 
are complaint-driven. This skews country assessment toward those 
whose trade unions avail themselves of the COFA complaint 
procedure, or countries targeted by trade unionists elsewhere if in-
country trade unions are not in a position to file complaints. 
Approximately half of all COFA complaints involve Latin American 
countries in part because Latin American unions have become 
accustomed to using this mechanism.50 The ILO's procedures are less 
familiar to many trade unionists and their allies in Asia and Africa. 
This underscores the obvious point that several sources of information 
are needed to construct a valid assessment system. 
C. Group Three: Comparative Scoring and Ranking Systems 
These studies explicitly compare or rank countries according to a 
measured degree of compliance with core labor standards on freedom 
of association. They cover and comparatively rank a sizeable number 
of countries. They review all aspects of freedom of association using 
48. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS 
ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL REPORT AND 
OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING PARTICULAR COUNTRIES (2002), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/rep-iii-la.htm. 
49. See ILO COFA, Complaint against the Government of the United States of America 
presented by the AFL-CIO, 1 92, Report No. 278, Case No. 1543 (1991). 
50. See ILO, Cases before the Committee on Freedom of Association, at the ILO Web site 
at http://www.ilo.org. Cases are organized by region and by country for calculating numbers and 
sources of complaints. 
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detailed sets of evaluation criteria. They draw on a wide variety of 
data, but rely heavily on the three reporting systems from group two. 
They transform the data into a weighted index of compliance. At the 
same time, each acknowledges that at some point in their process 
subjective judgments have to be made. 
The three reporting systems in this group are: 1) a 1996 OECD 
study (updated in 2000) that developed an index of compliance with 
freedom of association standards as part of an investigation of the link 
between labor standards and trade and investment flows; 2) a study 
conducted by David Kucera at the International Institute for Labor 
Studies (IILS) with an index of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining as part of a broader look at the relationship between 
workers' rights, labor costs, and investment flows; and 3) a study 
carried out by the Massachusetts-based NGO Verite for the California 
Public Employees Retirement System to assess labor rights in 
emerging country markets to guide the pension fund's investment 
choices. 
1. OECD 
The OECD's seminal 1996 report Trade, Employment and 
Labour Standards is a good example of the challenge of constructing a 
labor rights assessment system. Using reports by the ILO's CEARC 
and COFA committees, U.S. State Department Section 6 reports, and 
information from ICFTU reports, the OECD tried to wring out 
subjective judgment by calculating an index of compliance with 
freedom of association for each country studied (twenty-four OECD 
members and fifty others). 
The index was based on values assigned first to findings of 
violations, rated on a 1-5 scale covering "most severe violation" (5 
points), "severe violation" (4 points), "major restriction" (3 points), 
"moderately severe restriction" (2 points), and "least severe 
restriction" (1 point). A second category ranked findings in COFA 
and CEARC reports on a 0-4 scale between "most critical" findings (4 
points), "critical" (3 points), "moderately critical" (2 points), "least 
critical" (1 point), and "favorable" (0 points).51 These findings were 
based on formulaic parsing of CEARC and COFA reports for phrase-
based indicators in a range between "no efforts" by government under 
scrutiny to comply with ILO standards to finding "with satisfaction" 
51. See OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS 234-235 (1996). 
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that government has come into compliance, and assigning a 0-4 
numerical value to key phrases. 
The OECD used its findings to place countries into four groups 
based on their level of compliance with freedom of association 
standards. Group 1, with most OECD member countries and a 
handful of others, includes those where freedom of association "is by 
and large guaranteed in law and practice." Group 2 was comprised of 
sixteen countries where "some restrictions exist, but it is possible to 
establish independent workers' organizations and union 
confederations." Group 3, the largest, had countries where 
"restrictions on freedom of association are significant." Group 4 
included seven countries where "freedom of association is practically 
non-existent."52 
The OECD acknowledged that its index "inevitably embodies an 
element of Secretariat judgment" in categorizing violations and 
committee evaluations. The OECD's "most severe" category is 
unarguable, including murders and attacks on union members. But 
the other end of the scale is questionable. The OECD rated as a 
"least severe" restriction a government's prohibition of trade union 
political activity. This is a serious abridgment of workers' freedom of 
association in most contexts. The OECD rated higher (i.e., worse), as 
a "moderately severe" restriction, laws establishing eligibility 
requirements for union leaders. This is indeed a problem in many 
countries, but to say it is a greater problem than prohibiting trade 
union political activity is a questionable approach undermining 
confidence in the overall analysis. 
The problems with the OECD's approach show up in the results. 
For Sri Lanka, the 1996 report noted only that "Unions must submit 
reports to labour authorities, otherwise they are deregistered," 
without addressing widespread interference with workers' freedom of 
association in the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) factories.53 For Colombia, 
the problem is that "government officials can attend union meetings," 
hardly the main problem when union activists are more likely to be 
assassinated. In Ecuador, the OECD noted, "The number of workers 
52. Id. at 43. In 2000, the OECD published an updated report, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND CORE LABOUR STANDARDS, taking into account U.S. State Department reports, ICFTU 
reports, and ILO committee reports since the first study was published in 1996. The rankings 
from 1996 were generally maintained, with the exceptions of Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. Each 
advanced one group (to groups 3,3, and 2, respectively). 
53. In the 2000 update, at 96, the OECD's comment on Sri Lanka said, "Update: No 
substantial changes noted. Workers have the right to form trade unions and there are many 
operating. However, union organisers do not have access to EPZs and there are reportedly no 
unions functioning in these zones." 
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required to establish an enterprise union is too high." This may well 
be true and a problem, but it pales in comparison with widespread 
firings, violence, and other reprisals against worker activists. Chilean 
trade unionists would take issue with the OECD's findings that, when 
it comes to protection of union members and collective bargaining 
rights, "protection is adequate." 
In the United States, millions of workers excluded from 
protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively— 
agricultural workers, domestic workers, low-level supervisors, 
independent contractors who are really dependent, and public 
employees in many states—find no mention of their predicament in 
the OECD report. Canadian workers in many provinces that severely 
restrict the right to strike, and public sector workers forced back to 
their jobs by strike-ending legislation, would be surprised to learn that 
the OECD finds Canada with "no noticeable restrictions" on the right 
to strike. 
The OECD did commendable work in trying to devise a 
systematic approach to evaluating countries' compliance with freedom 
of association standards. The use of ILO committee reports, Section 6 
reports, and ICFTU surveys is essential in any new system, but many 
other sources should be used to blend out the weaknesses and biases 
in those. The effort to devise a neutral scoring system based on 
carefully differentiated categories is also an important initiative, but it 
needs more careful calibration and more adjustment based on 
information best obtained by intensive in-country work. 
2. ILO International Institute for Labour Studies 
David Kucera's paper for the IILS builds on the OECD report 
and makes a significant contribution to the new field of labor rights 
assessment.54 Kucera uses the three basic sources that the OECD 
employed: U.S. State Department Section 6 reports, the ICFTU's 
annual survey, and ILO committee reports. To these he adds 
unionization rates, EPZ violations, and Freedom House findings. 
Kucera's main value added is the skillful use of thirty-seven very 
detailed criteria on freedom of association in his review of the three 
textual sources.55 Not all thirty-seven are listed here, but they include, 
54. See ILO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES, THE EFFECTS OF CORE 
WORKER RIGHTS ON LABOUR COSTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: EVALUATING THE 
"CONVENTIONAL WISDOM" (2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/ 
download/dpl3001.pdf. 
55. Id. at Table 1 (the OECD lists half as many criteria but calls them "examples;" it is not 
clear if it used the same criteria as Kucera, supra note 13). 
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for example, "arrest, detention, imprisonment or forced exile for 
union membership or activities," "employment conditional on non-
membership in union," "union control of finances," "exclusion of 
tradeable industrial sectors from right to collectively bargain," 
"previous authorization required by authorities [to strike]," and 
"restricted rights in EPZs." He assigns 0 to "no evidence" of 
violations and 1 to "evidence," and weights each criterion on a scale of 
1-1.25-1.50-1.75-2, "with greater weight indicating what are judged to 
be more severe problems" based in part on the qualitative language 
used in COFA reports.56 
Kucera's attention to such details advances the labor rights 
evaluation enterprise, but his method still has important limits. In any 
one country subject to this method, only a fraction of the thirty-seven 
criteria will show results based on one of his textual sources, and only 
a fraction of these will have results based on more than one source. In 
the hypothetical example for one country in Table 1, for example, 
thirteen of the thirty-seven criteria show "evidence" or "no evidence." 
The rest of the criteria have no findings either way. Of the thirteen 
"scorable" criteria, six are based on one source—the ICFTU survey, 
the Section 6 report, or a COFA decision. Six criteria are based on 
findings of violations in two of these three sources. Only one is based 
on all three sources. 
This was a hypothetical example to demonstrate his scoring 
system. Unfortunately, Kucera's paper does not contain country-by-
country freedom of association scores for named countries (one may 
presume this was an ILO mandate so as to not offend a low-ranking 
member country). Thus, it is not possible to compare his findings with 
those of the OECD or Verite scoring systems, nor with a reader's own 
knowledge of particular countries. 
This is a limited foundation that could be strengthened by use of 
more textual sources like independent NGO reports, publicly 
available code of conduct monitoring reports, reports from other 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies, articles by 
independent scholars and others. Naming and ranking countries 
would also help. 
Each of Kucera's sources has its own problems and limitations, 
some of which are discussed below, but each adds a corrective to the 
biases of others. Kucera himself said it clearly and well in another 
paper describing his methodology: "Consider the problem of union 
dismissal. The Institute's measure treats one dismissal the same as a 
56. Id. at 12. 
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thousand dismissals. The OECD approach need not. . . . Different 
approaches have different strengths and weaknesses, and the study of 
relationships between rights at work and other desired outcomes 
would be deepened through the use of multiple approaches and 
measures."57 
3. Verite's CalPERS Labor Rights Screen58 
One of the most important efforts at quantitative and 
comparative evaluation of countries' compliance with core labor 
standards has taken shape in the field of socially responsible investing. 
The California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) is 
the single largest pension fund in the United States. In 2000, it 
contracted with Verite, an NGO that monitors companies' corporate 
social responsibility, to provide a quantitative ranking of twenty-seven 
"emerging market" countries to determine the appropriateness of 
CalPERS investments in those countries. Based on these findings, 
CalPERS announced withdrawal of its investments in four Asian 
countries because of labor rights violations.59 
Verite ranked each country on its performance in forty-seven 
separate indicators of labor rights compliance. Of these, thirteen 
indicators addressed freedom of association. The indicators were 
plugged into four weighted categories and a top score of 40 points: 
• ratification of ILO core conventions (10% of total 
score; maximum 4 points); 
• laws and legal system (25% of total score; 
maximum 10 points); 
• institutional capacity — "each government's capacity 
to implement its laws and policies" (15% of total 
score; maximum 6 points); and, 
• implementation effectiveness— "the actual level of 
compliance with or violations of the standards" 
(50% of total score; maximum 20 points). 
Scoring ILO convention ratification was a rote exercise assigning 
0.5 points for each ratification. Scoring the adequacy of laws and legal 
system was more complex, requiring careful legal analysis to award a 
57. See Kucera, supra note 13, at 134. 
58. See VERITY, REPORT TO CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
(CALPERS): EMERGING MARKETS RESEARCH PROJECT, available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/verite-report-2003.pdf. 
59. See Elizabeth Wine, Calpers Withdraws From Investments in Asia: Latest Move Stems 
From Pension Fund's Concern Over Social Responsibility, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 22, 2002, 
at 25. 
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full score where laws fully protect the right described in the relevant 
ILO convention, deductions where the law lacks a key provision or 
partially contradicts the ILO convention, and no points where the law 
directly contradicts the convention. Here Verite used a template of 
seven yes/no propositions on freedom of association (one example: 
"workers are protected from discrimination if they join a union or 
participate in union activities"). The proposition "the right to strike is 
protected by law" was broken into three scoring options: 1) no or few 
restrictions on the right to strike, 2) some restrictions, 3) significant 
restrictions. 
For institutional capacity measurement, Verite conducted in-
country interviews and examined statistical data using a five-question 
template addressing the following issues: 
• breadth of administrative coverage within 
enforcement departments; 
• adequacy of personnel and budgets compared to 
number of workplaces; 
• frequency and adequacy of inspections; 
• scale and frequency of labor-related corruption; 
and, 
• severity and frequency of fines levied for 
violations. 
The results of this examination were boiled down to a single indicator 
expressed as the "effectiveness of governmental capacity to develop, 
monitor, correct, and implement labor laws." 
Interviewers also examined NGO capacity in the country and 
whether NGOs are legally or informally restricted from advocating for 
workers' rights. Government capacity comprised 80% of the overall 
institutional capacity score. NGO capacity was 20% of the score. 
These two institutional capacity indicators were converted to 
percentages and then combined for a weighted percentage, multiplied 
by the six points available in this category to arrive at the total points. 
To measure implementation effectiveness, Verite focused on the 
scale of problems in each area, reducing scores where violations are 
significant. It also looked at the quality of government responses to 
problems, reducing scores where governments failed to adopt 
programs and policies to address specified problems and assessing the 
effectiveness of programs where they exist. 
For freedom of association issues, Verite looked at four items, 
three of them with a 0-3 scoring assignment and one with a yes/no 
result. They are: 
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• Independence of trade unions: fully independent (3 
points), somewhat independent (2 points), limited 
independence (1 point), government-controlled (0 
points). 
• Non-formal restrictions on organizing rights: rare 
or insignificant restrictions (3 points), restrictions 
of limited impact (2 points), moderately significant 
restrictions (1 point), significant restrictions (0 
points). 
• Collective bargaining without government or 
business interference: widely used and generally 
effective (3 points), used in limited circumstances 
and/or with some limitations (2 points), used in 
limited circumstances with significant limitations (1 
point), ineffective and/or not widely used (0 
points). 
• De-facto weakening or suspension of freedom of 
association in EPZs: yes/no result— yes results in 
deduction of 25% from implementation 
effectiveness score for freedom of association; no 
results in no change to score. 
Verite's overall rankings for CalPERS put Hungary at the top 
and China at the bottom of the twenty-seven countries reviewed. 
These rankings are based on all the core labor standards—forced 
labor, child labor, and discrimination, in addition to freedom of 
association. Rankings for freedom of association or any other single 
core standard are not presented. The overall rankings are credible, 
but it is questionable whether freedom of association scoring by itself 
would find Chile (fourth overall) or South Korea (tenth overall) as 
highly placed. 
Verite has carved out an important niche in the labor rights 
monitoring field, and its work should certainly be considered in 
constructing a new compliance measurement system. Its CalPERS 
project reflects a careful evaluation and scoring system in an effort to 
attain objective, quantitative results. But once past the rote recording 
of ILO convention ratification, scoring the other three categories — 
laws and legal system, institutional capacity, and implementation 
effectiveness—requires increasingly sophisticated interpretation and 
analysis. 
What appears to be an objective toting up of scores is really an 
exercise in subjective judgment. This is not a criticism; there is no 
other way to do it. Verity acknowledges as much when it notes that, 
regarding data collection, "a range of sources was used to determine a 
country's performance on each of the forty-four indicators. Where 
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sources disagreed, Verite researchers relied on the organization's 
institutional experience and the opinions of in-country consultants to 
determine the best measure." 
D. Academic Research 
It is not an organization or institution producing "reports" in the 
usual public policy sense, but the community of scholars working on 
international labor issues is an important, underused resource for 
assessing countries' compliance with core labor standards. The 
reporting organizations discussed in this paper, especially 
governmental and international institutions, look almost exclusively at 
economists' research. Many of these reports probe the links between 
labor rights and economic performance, so economists' work is 
central. But this focus on economics misses a rich well of information 
in other disciplines produced by scholars with deep country and 
regional expertise. 
Reserves of expertise can be found at many research institutions 
in the United States and around the world in law, industrial relations, 
political science, sociology, and other academic disciplines. In many 
fields, researchers from different institutions collaborate to produce 
significant contributions on labor issues. University researchers also 
usually have valuable networks of foreign colleagues who bring their 
own national expertise to joint research and writing projects. 
Looking at the programs of major academic congresses like the 
Industrial Relations Research Association (and its international 
counterpart, the International Industrial Relations Association), the 
American Political Science Association, the Latin American Studies 
Association, the American Sociological Association, and others, one 
finds a huge amount of valuable country-specific research on labor 
issues. 
With all the new attention to globalization and related issues, 
scholarly journals contain a wealth of articles on countries and regions 
that can contribute to assessing countries' compliance with 
international labor standards. Moreover, the peer-review process in 
academic publishing provides an extra layer of quality guarantee of 
these sources in ways not found in trade union, NGO, and 
government reporting. 
The field of international labor law has a large literature on labor 
rights, most of it very recent, with carefully researched articles on 
specific countries. Yet the Comparative Labor Law and Policy 
Journal, the International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
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Industrial Relations, or any one of a dozen more high quality law 
journals devoted to global labor issues, are rarely cited by the 
reporting bodies reviewed here. 
Labor law experts are equally guilty of ignoring other disciplines. 
Like economists cite economists, political scientists cite political 
scientists, and so on, legal scholars mostly cite other law journal 
articles. No one has full acquaintance with academic sources and 
publications in all fields touching on international labor rights.60 An 
ambitious new effort to create a comprehensive system for assessing 
countries' compliance with core labor standards ought to have high on 
its agenda a plan for linking these divided disciplines. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This brief survey of various organizations' efforts to assess 
country compliance with freedom of association standards, as defined 
by the ILO, ranges over many methodological strengths and 
weaknesses. There are proxy measures like ratification of ILO 
conventions, whose strength in objectivity goes hand-in-hand with 
shakiness in real-world relevance. There is descriptive reporting like 
human rights NGO reports or code of conduct factory reports, which 
do not by themselves provide quantitative or comparative 
measurement of country performance. One finds qualitative 
reporting based on sophisticated use of carefully constructed 
questionnaires, as well as evaluations based on unsystematic but still 
probing meetings and discussions with key actors. One finds reports 
that cover more than one hundred countries, and reports that cover 
just a few or even one. 
The OECD's seminal work and the more recent, sophisticated 
efforts in Kucera's IILS research and in Verite's CalPERS screen are 
the best examples of combining the strengths of quantitative measures 
alongside carefully extracted qualitative data for many countries. 
These three works are indispensable starting points, and 
recommendations to follow are built on those models. With this 
background, following are recommendations for constructing a 
database of information to evaluate countries' performance on 
workers' freedom of association. 
60. A project at the University of Michigan is making the attempt, at least among 
researchers willing to join the project. See Labor and Global Change Program of the University 
of Michigan at http://www.ilir.umich.edu/lagn. 
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A. Ask The Right Questions 
An indispensable first step in developing a freedom of association 
database is to formulate the questions or checklist whose answers will 
supply the information needed to construct comparative measures. A 
planning team should construct a template of questions going to all 
aspects of freedom of association, one that probes both government 
non-interference with workers' exercise of their rights and government 
action to protect the exercise. 
B. Develop A Composite Measure of Industrial Relations Indicators 
Union density, collective bargaining agreements across sectors, 
the fraction of the workforce covered by collective agreements, levels 
of bargaining (single workplace, company-wide, industry wide, 
regional/national, etc.), strike incidence, and other industrial relations 
data are relevant indicators, but they need careful interpretation to 
extract relevant measures. An advisory group of industrial relations 
scholars could help devise a composite index that captures how 
various measures serve as proxies for respect of the right to 
association, organize, bargain, and strike. 
C. Develop An "Unfair Labor Practice" Index of Reprisals Against 
Workers 
One proxy that may be most reflective of a country's compliance 
or lack of compliance with freedom of association standards is the 
number of workers fired for union activity—the most common 
violation of workers' freedom of association. A new assessment 
system should seek to quantify the volume of reprisals against workers 
in a country because of their organizing and bargaining efforts or 
because they take collective action to defend their rights. This can be 
done first based on records of relevant enforcement bodies (labor 
board and court decisions), but it would have to be supplemented by 
in-depth interviews with trade unionists, employers, and labor lawyers 
who live the system daily. 
D. Develop Further the Use and Quantifiability of "Capacity" 
Indicators 
Institutional and enforcement capacity indicators like those 
examined most intently in the CalPERS screen—budgets, personnel, 
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caseloads, enforcement actions, and the like—are susceptible to 
quantifiable analysis. These would have to be adjusted for size of the 
labor force, firm size and distribution, a country's level of 
development, and other factors. Of special importance are 
institutional structures meant to protect the right to organize and 
bargain—labor boards, labor courts, labor commissioners, and others 
who should act swiftly to remedy acts of anti-union discrimination. 
E. Expand the Range of Descriptive Sources 
The OECD, IILS, and Verite reports' reliance on three 
documentary sources (ILO, ICFTU, and State Department reports) is 
too limited. A new and comprehensive worker rights assessment 
program should systematically amass information from more 
descriptive sources, many but not all signaled here, to buttress a 
scoring system for performance of any country under scrutiny. For 
example, the OECD found that for Mexico's protection of union 
members and collective bargaining rights, "the situation is difficult to 
assess." The difficulty might be overcome by taking into account U.S. 
NAO reports, Human Rights Watch reports, code of conduct reports 
on Mexican maquiladora factories, Verite's Mexico report for 
CalPERS, social science journal articles on labor in Mexico, and other 
credible sources. Besides strengthening country-by-country analysis, a 
wider range of descriptive sources can help create accurate sets of 
industrial relations indicators, unfair labor practice indicators, and 
enforcement capacity indicators. 
F. Include Firm and Sector Reports in Gathering Information, Not 
Just Country Reports 
The goal is objective assessment of countries' performance on 
labor rights. But in most cases, workers' rights are respected or 
violated at the workplace, in specific companies operating in specific 
economic sectors. The performance of private sector firms is an 
important element in gauging the level of respect for freedom of 
association in a country. A large body of reporting on companies' 
performance has grown up in recent years. It ranges from self-
reporting under some corporate codes of conduct to extremely critical 
reports by NGOs and advocacy groups. Most of these reports deal as 
well with firms' and industries' relationship with government officials 
and agencies, too. The growing array of reporting on firm-level 
activity is an important asset in building a database that conveys an 
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accurate and insightful perspective on countries' compliance with core 
labor standards. 
G. Emphasize Systematic and Probing Interviewing of Key Actors in 
a Country 
The best qualitative indicators are based on intensive in-country 
research using information templates that probe the complexities of a 
labor relations system. A well-designed questionnaire can serve as a 
basis for systematic follow-up through interviews with key actors, 
posing the same questions to get at the subtleties in a country's labor 
life. 
Interviews with key actors are essential. In Mexico, for example, 
a community of activists and intellectuals linked to the independent 
trade union movement can explain in detail how these unions and 
their supporters suffer discrimination compared with "official" unions 
related to the PRI. 
Careful thought needs to be given to exactly who would conduct 
these interviews and how they would be carried out. It could be done 
by embassy labor officers who are already on the ground and have 
relationships with social actors. Unfortunately, in many countries U.S. 
government officials carry heavy baggage of a history of intervention, 
the image of U.S. bullying of smaller countries, the recent assertion of 
U.S. unilateralism in international affairs, and so on. 
The ILO might launch a proactive "clean slate" general review 
with a standardized questionnaire and field interviews, in addition to 
reviewing government self-reports and responding to complaints. But 
this might be asking too much of an institution that is already 
swamped with new work. The best "neutral" interviewers using 
standardized questionnaires might be respected local labor law 
scholars in each country or region. They are also on the ground, they 
know the players, and they know the issues. 
H. Acknowledge and Apply Consistent, Dispassionate Interpretation 
and Judgment 
No purely quantifiable system for assessing countries' compliance 
with freedom of association standards is possible. Even the three 
most sophisticated efforts at quantifying labor rights compliance — the 
OECD, IILS, and Verite schemes—acknowledged that in the end 
someone sitting in a room in Paris or Geneva or Boston said "2 
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points? 3 points? Let's give it a 3," or something like that, in 
constructing their country scores. 
One had to read closely to find these admissions. The OECD 
acknowledged that its index "inevitably embodies an element of 
Secretariat judgment." According to Kucera, an OECD "panel of 
evaluators" gave each country its 1-4 score for weakest or strongest 
rights.61 Kucera used the passive voice to describe his scoring method: 
"with greater weight indicating what are judged to be more severe 
problems." Verite said it relied on "the organization's institutional 
experience and the opinions of in-country consultants to determine 
the best measure." Their results reflect differing judgments: the 
OECD gave India a relatively high "Group 2" ranking; Verite rated 
India sixth from the bottom of its twenty-seven countries. 
In developing a new system for assessing countries' performance 
on labor rights, analysts should in the end use the best judgment of 
experts to help measure compliance, acknowledging the importance of 
interpretation and judgment. The important thing is consistency in 
applying the same standards of judgment to all countries alike. 
/. Assess the United States 
For an assessment system to have international credibility, 
freedom of association in the United States should undergo the same 
evaluation as every other country and the results should be included in 
country rankings. The ICFTU and the ILO's Committee on Freedom 
of Association have produced numerous reports on violations of 
American workers' organizing and bargaining rights. Human Rights 
Watch did an in-depth report on workers' freedom of association in 
the United States. Industrial relations data is extensive and reliable. 
Enforcement bodies have a wealth of information about unfair labor 
practices. In-country interviewing of key actors is relatively easy. 
DOL could apply the "first draft" of a labor rights assessment 
system to the United States. It can then open up the results to debate 
and comment within the U.S. labor relations community, and use their 
critiques to refine the assessment system for application to other 
countries—including the United States again, this time with the final 
system. 
61. ILO, supra note 46, at 9. 
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